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The theme for the 2015 Arctic Encounter Symposium was 
“Charting a Path to U.S. Leadership in the Far North.” I would 
like to begin my comments regarding U.S. leadership by 
reminding the audience that the Arctic is primarily a maritime 
domain and the fundamental rule set for international 
relations in the Arctic’s maritime domain is the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),2 a 
convention to which the United States remains the most 
conspicuous non-party. This, despite the fact that in the 2008 
Ilulissat Declaration the United States joined the other states 
with maritime borders on the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, and Russia), in affirming the central importance of 
the Convention. In rejecting suggestions by some to negotiate 
an area-specific treaty for the Arctic similar to the treaty 
regime in place for the Antarctic, the five Arctic coastal states 
recalled in that 2008 Declaration that: 
[A]n extensive international legal framework 
applies to the Arctic Ocean. . . Notably, the law of 
the sea provides for important rights and 
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the 
1. Judson Falknor Professor of Law and of Marine and Environmental Affairs and 
Director, Arctic Law and Policy Institute, University of Washington. This article is 
based on remarks given to the Arctic Encounter Symposium on Jan. 31, 2015. 
2. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter “LOS Convention”], Dec. 10, 
1982, S. Treaty Doc. 103-39 (1994); 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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marine environment, including ice-covered areas, 
freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, 
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to 
this legal framework and to the orderly settlement 
of any possible overlapping claims.3 
 Broad Support for the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea 
The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea provides 
the legal framework for peacetime uses of the oceans. Its 
development over a period of more than fourteen years is 
among the most significant feats in the history of international 
lawmaking. The Convention’s 320 articles and nine annexes 
now govern all aspects of ocean space, including navigation, 
boundary delimitation, environmental protection, marine 
scientific research, living and nonliving marine resources, 
transfer of technology, and peaceful settlement of disputes. 
When the Convention was opened for signature in Jamaica 
in 1982, it was hailed by the conference president as a 
“constitution for the oceans.”4 It was also viewed by many as 
the most comprehensive international law project ever 
completed. The Convention stipulated that it would enter into 
force one year after sixty states ratified it. Guyana provided 
the key ratification in 1993, and the Convention entered into 
force on November 16, 1994.5 By the end of 2014, 166 states 
have become a party to the Convention. The United States is 
not among them. 
For the most part, the 1982 LOS Convention takes a “zonal” 
approach to the oceans, under which a state’s rights and 
responsibilities depend on the location of the vessel or activity. 
The zones are each measured from the “baseline.”6 All waters 
landward of the baseline constitute the “internal” waters of the 
3. Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Governance, Ilulissat, Greenland, (May 27–29, 
2008), http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. 
4. Remarks of Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/koh_english.pdf. 
5. U.S. DIVISION OF OCEAN AFFAIRS AND LAW OF THE SEA, Chronological lists of 
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related 
Agreements as of 3 October 2014, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#TheUnited Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. 
6. LOS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 5, 7. 
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state.7 Moving seaward from the baseline, the water column is 
divided into the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the high seas. Moving from the 
water column to the seabed below, the coastal state’s 
submerged lands extend from the baseline to the outer edge of 
the territorial sea, followed by the continental shelf and the 
international seabed (also called “the Area”). In brief 
summary, for those unfamiliar with the Convention’s overall 
structure, it provides that: 
 Coastal states exercise sovereignty over a territorial 
sea extending up to twelve nautical miles from the 
state’s baseline; 
 Vessels (but not aircraft) of all states have a right of 
“innocent passage” through the territorial sea; 
 Ships and aircraft of all states also enjoy a more 
liberal right of “transit passage” through “straits 
used for international navigation”; 
 Coastal states have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical 
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to 
natural resources and certain economic activities, 
and exercise jurisdiction over environmental 
protection and marine science research in the zone; 
 All other states have freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines; 
 Coastal states have sovereign rights over their 
continental shelf for exploring and exploiting its 
natural resources; a coastal state’s continental shelf 
extends at least 200 nautical miles from the baseline, 
and may extend more than that where the physical 
“continental margin” extends that far; 
 States claiming an “extended” continental shelf 
(ECS) beyond 200 miles submit data substantiating 
their claims to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS); the CLCS examines the 
submission and then issues recommendations on 
whether the claims comply with Article 76; claims 
that conform to the CLCS recommendations are final 
and binding; 
 Coastal states are required to share with the 
7. Id. art. 8. 
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international community part of the revenue derived 
from exploiting resources from their extended 
continental shelf; 
 The International Seabed Authority in Kingston 
Jamaica controls access to mineral resources in “The 
Area” (the deep seabed beyond any nation’s 
continental shelf); 
 All states enjoy the traditional freedoms of 
navigation, overflight, scientific research and fishing 
on the high seas; they are obliged to cooperate with 
other states in adopting measures to manage and 
conserve living resources; 
 States are bound to prevent and control marine 
pollution and are liable for damage caused by any 
violation of their international obligations to combat 
such pollution; 
 States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are 
admonished to cooperate in managing living 
resources, environmental and scientific research 
policies and activities; 
 All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf is subject to the consent of the 
coastal state, but in most cases the coastal state is 
obliged to grant consent to other states when the 
research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and 
fulfills specified criteria (generally equivalent to what 
is commonly called “pure” research in contrast with 
“applied” research); 
 States-parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means 
any disputes that arise concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Convention; 
 Disputes between parties can be submitted to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) established by the LOS Convention, the 
International Court of Justice, or to arbitration. 
Conciliation is also available and, in certain 
circumstances, submission is made compulsory. The 
ITLOS has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed 
mining disputes. 
Applying the Convention’s zonal approach to the Arctic 
Ocean, the majority of the ocean waters fall within one of the 
five coastal states’ territorial seas or 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). The Central Arctic Ocean—the high seas 
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waters beyond any coastal state’s EEZ—spans an area of 
approximately 1.1 million square miles.8 Of the five states 
bordering the Arctic Ocean, all but the United States have 
submitted extended continental shelf claims to the 
Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf.9 Nevertheless, 
at least part of the seabed beneath the waters of the Central 
Arctic Ocean will fall within the Area and therefore under the 
control of the International Seabed Authority. 
The U.S. has already taken advantage of the Convention’s 
extended territorial sea and exclusive economic zone 
provisions. In 1983, President Reagan issued a proclamation 
establishing a 200-nautical mile wide U.S. exclusive economic 
zone.10 Five years later he issued a second proclamation 
extending the U.S. territorial sea from three miles to twelve 
miles (but only for international law purposes).11 Although the 
United States has conducted extensive surveys that could be 
used to support an extended continental shelf (ECS) claim in 
the Arctic,12 as a non-party it has not submitted an ECS claim 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
 Support for Accession to the LOS Convention 
The 1982 LOS Convention sets out a carefully-drafted 
balance between safety, security and stewardship in the 
maritime domain. It is not a perfect treaty (is there such a 
thing?), but on balance, it is a very good treaty for the United 
States. The audience need not take my word for that. The first 
recommendation to come out of the bipartisan blue ribbon U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy, chaired by former chief of naval 
8. Council on Foreign Relations, The Emerging Arctic, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/polar-regions/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/?cid=otr_marketing_use-
arctic_Infoguide#!. 
9. See U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Submissions, through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, pursuant to art. 76, para. 8, of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. 
10. Proclamation 5030, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States, Mar. 10, 
1983, 3 C.F.R. § 22 (1984). 
11. Proclamation 5928, Territorial Sea of the United States, Dec. 27, 1988, 3 C.F.R. § 
546 (1989). 
12. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, U.S. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL 
SHELF PROJECT, available at http://continentalshelf.gov/. 
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operations and secretary of energy James Watkins, was a 
recommendation that the United States accede to the 1982 
Convention.13 Similarly, former secretary of defense and CIA 
director Leon Panetta supported accession in his capacity as 
chairman of the prestigious Pew Ocean Commission.14 
Following a decade-long debate over the Convention’s 
strengths and weaknesses, Canada—our Arctic neighbor and 
fellow member of NATO and the Arctic Council—ratified the 
Convention in 2003.15 
In 1994, President Clinton presented the LOS Convention to 
the Convention for its advice and consent.16 In the intervening 
twenty-one years, each succeeding president has also 
supported U.S. accession. For example, President Bush’s 2009 
Arctic Policy presidential directive made clear the position of 
his administration: 
The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, 
including with respect to the Arctic. Joining will 
serve the national security interests of the United 
States, including the maritime mobility of our 
Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. 
sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, 
including the valuable natural resources they 
contain. Accession will promote U.S. interests in the 
environmental health of the oceans. And it will give 
the United States a seat at the table when the 
rights that are vital to our interests are debated and 
interpreted.17 
13. See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, 444–45 (2004). 
14. Testimony of Leon Panetta, Chairman, Pew Oceans Commission, Hearing before 
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Mar. 24, 2004), S. Hrg. 108-498 at 11; available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-108shrg94598/html/CHRG-108shrg94598.htm. 
15. U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Declarations made upon 
signature, ratification, accession or succession or anytime thereafter, Canada entry, 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_ 
declarations.htm#Canada. 
16. President’s Message to Congress Transmitting United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 103-39 (1994). 
Because the United States did not sign the Convention during the 1982–1984 period 
during which it was open for signature under Article 305, it may become a party to the 
Convention only by accession rather than ratification. LOS Convention, supra note 2, 
art. 307. The legal effect is the same. 
17. George W. Bush, Arctic Region Policy, Presidential Directive 66/Homeland 
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Similarly, President Obama emphasized the nexus between 
international law and national security in his 2013 National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region, in which he focused on three 
lines of effort. One of the three lines was to: 
Strengthen International Cooperation—Working 
through bilateral relationships and multilateral 
bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue 
arrangements that advance collective interests, 
promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the 
Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, 
and we will work toward U.S. accession to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.18 
President Obama reiterated his commitment to U.S. 
accession in the recently-released 2015 National Security 
Strategy, in which he warned that failure to ratify UNCLOS 
“undermines our national interest in a rules-based 
international order.”19 
While serving as Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral 
Papp—the newly appointed U.S. Special Representative for the 
Arctic—joined a virtual flotilla of flag and general officers who 
testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 
favor of accession to the Convention.20 Admiral Papp led off by 
emphasizing that the United States is a maritime nation and 
an Arctic nation. He then went on to state his firm belief that 
accession to the Convention would help ensure America’s 
Arctic future. 
 Fate in the U.S. Senate: Close, but Never a Floor Vote 
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, approval by a two-
thirds majority of the Senate is required for U.S. accession to 
the Convention. The decision whether to accede has come 
Security Presidential Directive 26, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ 
nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
18. Barack Obama, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 10, 2013, at 13, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
19. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States, Feb. 2015, at 
13, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_ 
strategy.pdf. 
20. Testimony of Admiral Robert Papp, Commandant U.S. Coast Guard, on 
Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, before Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, June 14, 2012, available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Admiral_Robert_Papp_ Testimony.pdf. Admiral Papp noted that his six predecessors 
who served as commandant also supported the Convention. 
 
                                               
8 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:1 
before the relevant Senate committees on three occasions. On 
February 25, 2004, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
unanimously recommended to the full Senate that the United 
States accede to the Convention.21 The Committee’s 
recommendation was subject to four “declarations” and twenty-
two “understandings.” Most of the Committee’s recommended 
declarations and understandings were adopted from the 
Clinton administration’s 1994 letter transmitting the 
Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent and the 
attached ninety-seven-page commentary on the Convention’s 
articles prepared by the State Department.22 The Clinton 
administration understandings were in turn largely consistent 
with the position of the U.S. delegation during the UNCLOS 
III negotiations and with President Reagan’s 1983 Ocean 
Policy Statement; however, they also reflected the changes 
made by the 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement.23 
Because the full Senate did not vote on the Committee’s 2004 
recommendation before the end of the 108th Congress, the 
matter was returned to the Committee. In 2007 the Committee 
again held hearings and favorably reported out the 
Convention,24 yet the recommendation again failed to reach 
the full Senate for a vote. 
In the spring of 2012 the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations convened a third round of hearings on the 
Convention.25 Convention proponents and opponents again 
exchanged views on the Convention’s merits,26 the relationship 
21. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. EXEC. REP., 108–10 (2004). The Committee also 
recommended ratification of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI. 
22. President’s Message to Congress Transmitting United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, supra note 16. 
23. See, e.g., Note by the Secretariat, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, 243–44, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 (Dec. 10, 1982). 
24. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. EXEC. REP. 110–09 (2007). 
25. For a collection of essays on the merits of accession to the convention by military, 
government, and academic experts, see THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION: U.S. 
ACCESSION AND GLOBALIZATION (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2012). 
26. The author contributed two essays to an online debate hosted by Opinio Juris 
during the 2012 Senate hearings. See Craig H. Allen, The International Law of the 
Sea: A Treaty for Thee; Customary Law for Me?, OPINIO JURIS (June 14, 2012), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/14/the-international-law-of-the-sea-a-treaty-for-thee-
customary-law-for-me/; Craig H. Allen, Will Compulsory Dispute Settlement Sink the 
LOS Convention in the Senate?, OPINIO JURIS (June 17, 2012), 
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between conventional and customary international law, 
revenue sharing with respect to resources extracted from the 
extended continental shelf, the role of international 
organizations, and the merits of a compulsory process for 
adjusting disputes between and among states.27 A recurring 
point of contention concerned the effect of accession to the 
Convention on U.S. sovereignty (particularly the requirements 
for compulsory dispute settlement) and security (potential 
restrictions on “military activities”).28 Despite letters and 
testimony in support of accession from the Departments of 
Defense, State, and Homeland Security; the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, the 2012 initiative failed to 
even reach a vote within the Committee before the 112th 
congressional term expired in January 2013.29 
During the 113th Congress (spanning the January 2013—
January 2015 biennium), the Senate gave its consent to 
ratification of three important multilateral treaties negotiated 
to protect the oceans’ living marine resources,30 demonstrating 
that body’s commitment to advancing the rule of law in ocean-
space; however, neither the Obama administration nor the 
Senate took any action to move the stalled LOS Convention. 
The 2014 elections sent thirteen new senators (twelve 
Republicans and one Democrat) to Washington in January 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/17/will-compulsory-dispute-settlement-sink-the-los-
convention-in-the-senate/. 
27. For a chronology of actions taken in the U.S. Senate, see U.S. Library of 
Congress “Thomas” entries for S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2. 
28. Some opponents have also argued that the Convention would encroach on 
domestic management of the nation’s fisheries and limit the nation’s long-term energy 
needs. 
29. The fate of the Convention in 2012 was essentially sealed when a total of thirty-
four senators wrote to the Senate majority leader indicating they would vote against 
accession, thus rendering a two-thirds majority numerically impossible to achieve. See, 
e.g., Letter from Senators Rob Portman and Kelly Ayotte to Hon. Harry Reid (July 16, 
2012), available at http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve? 
File_id=317ccc22-1649-4982-944f-ca1d97e14075. 
30. Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, S. Treaty Doc. No. 113-1, Mar. 13, 2014; 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in 
the North Pacific Ocean, S. Treaty Doc. No. 113-2, Mar. 13, 2014; Amendment to the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 113-3, Mar. 13, 2014. 
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2015 and gave the Republican Party control of the Senate. 
Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell was elected Senate 
Majority Leader. 2015 will also mark the start of the United 
States’ two-year term as chair of the Arctic Council. Whether 
the Arctic Council chairmanship will raise the visibility of Law 
of the Sea issues with the recently “refreshed” membership 
and leadership remains to be seen. 
 U.S. National Interests in the Arctic will be Enhanced by 
Accession 
The United States’ 2009 Arctic Region Policy articulates six 
national policy goals: (1) meet national security and homeland 
security needs relevant to the Arctic region; (2) protect the 
Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources; (3) 
ensure that natural resource management and economic 
development in the region are environmentally sustainable; (4) 
strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic 
nations; (5) involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in 
decisions that affect them; and (6) enhance scientific 
monitoring and research into local, regional, and global 
environmental issues.31 The policy directive goes on to 
emphasize that freedom of the seas is a top national priority.32 
Five of the six policy goals—including the “top national 
priority” of preserving freedom of the seas—will be enhanced 
by U.S. accession to the Convention. Three of those policy goals 
merit particular mention here. 
First, the policy statement highlights the importance to our 
national security of navigation rights through international 
straits in the Northwest Passage over North America and the 
Northern Sea Route over Russia’s northern border.33 Military 
and commercial navigation through those straits will become 
more important—and perhaps more contested—as the Arctic 
sea ice recedes and thins. Part III of the LOS Convention on 
straits used for international navigation includes twelve 
detailed articles that address the status of such straits, the 
right of transit passage, and the rights, responsibilities, and 
31. Arctic Region Policy, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
32. Id. at 2. 
33. To preserve global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft 
throughout the Arctic region the policy statement declares that the United States will 
“project a sovereign maritime presence” in the Arctic. Id. at 3. 
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jurisdiction of states bordering on those straits. Although a 
right of transit passage through international states almost 
certainly ripened into a rule of customary law by the time the 
LOS Convention entered into force in 1994 (and before Canada 
became a party to the Convention in 2003), it seems certain 
that the customary law rule is not nearly as well defined as the 
articles in Part III of the Convention. Only as a party to the 
Convention would the United States be in a position to assert 
the full scope of the navigation rights set out in Part III of the 
Convention. 
The second way in which U.S. national interests in the 
Arctic region will be enhanced requires no elaboration. The 
2009 Arctic Region Policy says it all when it observes that: 
Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed 
and subsoil in which the United States may exercise 
its sovereign rights over natural resources such as 
oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, minerals, and 
living marine species is critical to our national 
interests in energy security, resource management, 
and environmental protection. The most effective 
way to achieve international recognition and legal 
certainty for our extended continental shelf is 
through the procedure available to States Parties to 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.34 
The third way in which the U.S. national Arctic policy goals 
would be enhanced by accession to the LOS Convention 
concerns the nation’s commitment to enhancing scientific 
monitoring and research into local, regional, and global 
environmental issues, and measures that will ensure that 
natural resource management and economic development in 
the region are environmentally sustainable. Much of the 
research to accomplish those goals must necessarily be 
conducted in waters beyond U.S. jurisdiction. Unfortunately, 
U.S. oceanographers are presently at a serious disadvantage in 
gaining access to the offshore waters of other states. As an 
earlier presidential cabinet report concluded, our status as a 
non-party to the Convention “often slows or complicates 
approval for U.S. ships and aircraft access to conduct marine 
scientific research in foreign waters.”35 One disadvantage of 
34. Arctic Region Policy, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
35. Cabinet Report, Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, The Law of the Sea 
Convention, (1999), available at http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/oceanreport/ 
lawofsea.html. 
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our non-party status that stands out is that U.S. researchers 
are unable to take advantage of the more favorable “implied 
consent” provisions for gaining access to conduct marine 
scientific research in other states’ exclusive economic zones or 
on their continental shelves.36 
 Test the Convention’s Benefits and Drawbacks Against 
Future Scenarios 
If Senate leaders for the 114th Congress decide to give fresh 
consideration to the LOS Convention, “future scenarios” could 
provide a useful analytical tool in assessing the options.37  
Convention advocates and opponents alike might consider 
drafting a broad set of future scenarios to test the claimed 
benefits and drawbacks of accession. Each of the scenarios 
would be evaluated to determine how the outcome would vary, 
if the United States was or was not a party to the Convention. 
Possible scenarios could incorporate a future decision by a 
state bordering a critical international strait to renounce the 
LOS Convention, as Article 317 permits, and to then deny any 
right of transit passage through its waters. A variant of the 
renunciation scenario might posit a major maritime power 
renouncing the Convention after an unfavorable decision by 
one of the Convention’s dispute settlement bodies, or further 
decisions by major states (and permanent members of the 
Security Council) to boycott proceedings by those bodies.38 
Another scenario might focus on a proposal to amend Parts V 
and XIII of the Convention to define marine scientific research 
in a way that includes military surveys and intelligence 
collection activities.39 Still another scenario might posit a move 
by states bordering an enclosed sea to “modify” the effect of the 
36. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 252. No credible argument exists that the 
Convention’s implied consent regime reflects customary law. 
37. For guidance on scenario planning and analysis see Paul J.H. Schoemaker, 
Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking, SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 25–40 
(Winter 1995); PETER SCHWARTZ, THE ART OF THE LONG VIEW (1991). 
38. In 2013 Russia boycotted a prompt release action brought by the Netherlands 
under Article 292 of the Convention to obtain the release of the Greenpeace vessel 
Arctic Sunrise. Similarly, China has refused to participate in an Annex VIII 
arbitration action brought by the Philippines. 
39. Articles 312–316 of the Convention set out the procedures for amending the 
Convention. The Convention became subject to amendment in 2004, ten years after it 
entered into force. 
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Convention to exclude navigation in the sea by nuclear-
powered ships, ships carrying nuclear weapons, or ships 
transporting nuclear materials.40 Arctic-specific scenarios 
might focus on extended continental shelf disputes, access to 
fisheries resources in the Central Arctic Ocean, and the 
application of special protective measures for ice-covered 
waters under Article 234 of the Convention. 
 Conclusion 
Few would argue that the 1982 LOS Convention perfectly 
serves all of the United States’ interests.  But are the 
Convention’s flaws ‘fatal’ deal-breakers that require those 
acting in the national interest of the United States to reject the 
treaty? I submit that the answer is no. A treaty brings greater 
clarity than the rules of customary international law, along 
with stability and predictability. Clarity, stability, and 
predictability in the rule set for the oceans—and in particular 
in the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas—are plainly in the 
interest of the United States. The Symposium’s keynote 
speaker, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, has been a 
stalwart champion of U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea 
Convention.41 Let us hope that she can persuade two-thirds of 
her Senate colleagues in the 114th Congress—and the new 
majority leader, who like most of his predecessors is not from a 
coastal state—that U.S. maritime safety, security, and 
stewardship interests in the Arctic region all compellingly 
argue in favor of prompt accession to the 1982 LOS 
Convention. 
 
40. As between parties to the Convention, Article 311(3) would limit the effect of 
such a “modification” to the parties to that side agreement. Its effect on a non-party to 
the Convention would be governed by customary law. See LOS Convention, supra note 
2, art. 311(3). See also Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 41, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 336, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (modifications to multilateral treaties). 
41. See, e.g., Senator Lisa Murkowski, Opening Statement at S. Hrg. 108-498; Lisa 
Murkowski, Go North, America — to the Arctic, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, (June 28, 
2013) http://www.adn.com/article/20130628/go-north-america-arctic. 
 
                                               
